Before each of my disclosures I need to make the following declaration.
DECLARATION: For the record and avoidance of doubt I am a former Director of Lloyds Banking Group (LBG). I worked on the very trading floor where these toxic IRHP’s (Interest Rate Hedge Products) were traded and sold to customers of LBG. During my employment with LBG I repeatedly raised concerns, following the LBG Whistleblower Policy to the letter, and particularly how employees must raise these concerns so as to qualify them for the protection that the Whistleblower Policy declares that they are afforded by law, particularly PIDA (Public Interest Disclosure Act).
At my employment Tribunal LBG introduced, referred to and relied upon Tribunal case law. This and the subsequent disclosures I will be making are made in accordance, and consistent, with PIDA and that Employment Tribunal case law. Particularly, but not exclusively, this demands that to be protected a disclosure MUST:
- Be more than just a provision of information, it must include specific allegations
- Be made with a ‘reasonable belief’
- Be made in the public interest
During and since my employment with LBG I have made further protected disclosures to LBG all of which have been ignored, or been responded to with false representations and/or vague denials. I have therefore escalated these most serious concerns to The FCA, Andrew Bailey (then CEO of The FCA) personally, John Glen MP (Economic Secretary to the Treasury), the Treasury Select Committee (TSC) and Mel Stride as Chair of the TSC, City of London Police, the Serious Fraud Office to name but a few.
All of these escalations and the evidence provided to demonstrate, support and prove them have met with a response that was dishonest and/or obstructive and/or misleading and/or that sought to suppress and conceal both the allegations and the evidence pursuant to them. The result of which is that these concerns, disclosures and evidence have been concealed from the public, in whose interest they were made.
My protected disclosures whilst employed by LBG covered many elements of wrongdoing and, importantly, disclosures specific to conduct and sales practises that targeted and sought to defraud customers, ESPECIALLY, non-sophisticated customers.
THEREFORE, I am making this series of protected disclosures, and do so with more than a ‘reasonable belief’, so as to fulfil the public interest criteria of such a disclosure and making the public aware of them. Furthermore, and for the record, these disclosures are largely specific to the conduct of LBG, my former employer, and the various parties that have sought to suppress or conceal that conduct. Albeit that it will include reference to other evidence obtained that demonstrates the same or similar conduct by other banks and parties.
I made this protected disclosure directly to LBG CEO Charlie Nunn and the LBG Group Executive Complaints team on December 20th 2021 following the publication of Mr Swift’s report. Also copied on this disclosure were Abishek Sachdev, John Glen MP, Mr Swift and his team, The FCA whistleblower team, Charles Randell, FCA Chairman (and Non-Executive Director on whose behalf the ‘Independent Investigation’ by Mr Swift was carried out) and my MP, Laura Trott.
You will see that my disclosure includes the following:
“I do not expect a full response until January, but I must request that all parties, no later than 5.00pm Thursday December 23rd, communicate any challenge they have to any of the above as to accuracy and/or provide a comment for inclusion within the next protected disclosure that I will publish and that contains the above and evidence specific to the above.”
No party raised any concern or challenge as to the accuracy, or my proposed publication of the disclosure in its entirety.
The Swift Report – Fraud by way of ‘omission’?
As you might be aware, Mr Swift’s report confirms that senior executives representing banks including Lloyds Banking Group sought at the highest level, George Osborne, then Chancellor of the Exchequer to intervene in The FCA IRHP review with the sole intent of making financial gain and/or causing loss or risk of loss to others. They lobbied for Mr Osborne and HMT to take action to limit their liabilities arising from The FCA IRHP Review.
Whilst confirming this Mr Swift has sought to deny that this had any effect, and that the introduction of the new sophistication criteria in January 2013 that excluded 5,309 retail and non-sophisticated UK Business banking customers from the review, was NOT introduced as a result of that pressure and/or the efforts of Sajid Javid MP working on behalf of HMT, and under instruction from HMT and/or Osborne to deprive UK Businesses of the redress they were rightfully owed.
HOWEVER, nowhere in the report does Mr Swift reference the significant evidence that I presented to his team before and after my meeting with his team on February 12th 2020, or my significant testimony given to his team during that February 12th meeting. Evidence and testimony that was corroborated by Abishek Sachdev of Vedanta Hedging.
In my disclosure to Mr Nunn and the other relevant parties, you will see that I include the extract from the transcript of my meeting with Mr Swift’s team on February 12th, that is specific to this serious issue. This transcript was not ‘perfect’ but was provided by Mr Swift’s team following the meeting.
At no time was I asked to keep matters confidential or asked to sign an NDA to that effect.
Perhaps someone can explain why Mr Swift made his conclusions without any mention or reference to the significant evidence and testimony that I and Mr Sachdev gave to him? He presents his conclusions as if ‘Gospel’ and as if no evidence was presented to suggest other. In all such reports, there is an absolute obligation by the investigator, author or even Judge in Court, to include any and all contradictory evidence and testimony, confirm that it was all considered and explain why it was disregarded or dismissed.
Mr Swift has failed to do that. I do not know to what extent other parties were able to modify or manipulate Mr Swift’s report, but he has allowed it to be published as a fair representation of his investigation and findings.
Prior to reading the disclosure below you should be aware that prior to the February 12th meeting with Mr Swift’s team, and therefore the extract of the transcript of that meeting you will read below, I had emailed them all of the evidence that you can find in this blog article from February 2020.
MY PROTECTED DISCLOSURE SENT TO LBG CEO CHARLIE NUNN (with others copied) ON DECEMBER 20TH 2021.
Dear Mr Nunn, Mr Swift, Mr Glen, The Treasury Select Committee and Mr Randell,
(I have attached the first formal protected disclosure of many in respect to the Swift Report and its findings that was submitted to Mr Nunn, Mr Swift and the FCA last night and published on Twitter last night, for the benefit of those that have not yet seen it.)
I refer you all to the declaration within it for the record. [see my declaration above]
I submit this new formal protected disclosure in tandem with Mr Sachdev, another former LBG employee.
I refer you to the email from Mr Swift’s team within the attached document whereby they ask for my permission to discuss the email exchange I had with Mr Sachdev in November 2017, and whereby I grant that permission. For the record this request from Mr Swift’s team was made AFTER my meeting with them, and after I had given them my verbal testimony on the Javid issue, including explaining in great detail and with further supporting evidence, why the criteria could not possibly have been introduced for the reasons falsely claimed by the FCA and HMT, namely, the findings of the Pilot Study.
[You can see this email and my communications with Mr Swift in my prior disclosure – http://jupiter87.com/2021/12/the-swift-report-protected-disclosures-number-1-of-many/ ]
For the record, I include that testimony taken from the transcript of my meeting with Mr Swift’s team on February 12th 2020. A transcript provided by Mr Swift’s team.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: You said your involvement with IRHPs started around 2015 so you had some prior cases or …
MR CARLIER: Did I say 2015? No, my new role in litigation support started in 2015 and we worked on a number of different cases but my real involvement in IRHP [cases] began in 2017 with my first review of the evidence in Julia’s case. If you see my email to Abhishek there —-
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: That is November 2017.
MR CARLIER: Yes. The bank was making all kinds of talk about settlement, a settlement meeting and everything else which, not surprisingly, turned out to be a complete smokescreen but we kept batting up again this criterion, this sophistication criterion, and I couldn’t understand when reading why this was put in – it made no sense. A £10 million complete blanket.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: So the sophistication criterion appears to be at the heart of your concerns about the scheme.
MR CARLIER: It does, yes.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: Can you give us a short explanation of exactly what you think the problem with this criterion is and how it has impacted on the scheme?
MR CARLIER: In the first instance you’re effectively giving the banks a get out of jail free card and their salespeople because you can’t introduce a retrospective criterion in terms of sophistication because the classification governs how the customer was bound to be treated by the banks at the point of sale, so you can’t then allow them to just lie or withhold or conceal information from the customer which would be against the rules for a non-sophisticated customer and then get round that by later saying “You know what, in 2013 we are going to say that actually in 2007 you were sophisticated so you no longer qualify.” That is my first real issue.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: You are saying, just to clarify – tell me if this is wrong – you are not so much concerned with whether these customers were sophisticated or not, you are saying the problematic thing is they were treated as non-sophisticated when being sold the product but then for the purposes of redress there was a different criterion.
MR CARLIER: The point is that the bank had an obligation – if you are dealing with a non-sophisticated or retail customer the bank has additional obligations, one of which is you can’t sell them a complex product such as these collars. Therefore if you forget the sophistication criterion that was introduced in 2013 all of these were mis-sales, and the FCA kind of confirms that because these were all in the scheme in the first place. The 5300 that were excluded were excluded after they had already been told that they were in it because they qualified under all previous measures and all previous benchmarks. The problem here is that by doing that you then turn conduct that was absolutely wrong, was absolutely in breach of all applicable codes, you are basically now saying that actually, looking back, it was fine and you excuse all that conduct that occurred. You can’t do that; you can’t change the law today and say, okay, walking around with a mobile phone in your hands is now illegal so everyone who has done that in the past six years off to jail you go or here is a big fine. The whole point is that at the point of sale, did the bank act appropriately and as they should have done. By introducing this criterion you basically gave the bank a get out of jail free card in 5300 cases and the criterion itself makes no sense.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: Putting the question another way, obviously you are talking about retail customers at point of sale —
MR CARLIER: Yes.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: — and that they are owed particular and additional duties which are different from those that apply to professional or market counterparties.
MR CARLIER: Yes, those that would be classified as sophisticated.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: The redress scheme, however, took the pool of retail customers and imposed a cut-off within that pool of retail customers by reference to these various size criteria so the original scheme had those three things about employees —
MR CARLIER: Yes.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: — and then the modified scheme had this maximum of £10 million notional IRHP exposure.
MR CARLIER: Yes.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: Is another way of putting what you are saying to say that actually to try and impose an arbitrary line amongst that retail customer group was wrong and that if they were retail they won, they should all have been in?
MR CARLIER: Yes, in simple terms that was it. It is not actually my judgement call now because the FCA, by including them in the first place, were saying that they qualified under all existing sophistication criteria and it wasn’t until the end of January 2013 that they decided to bring in this criterion and retrospectively apply it.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: Again, just to be sure I understand this, the pilot scheme looked at some hundreds – I’m not sure how many …
MR CARLIER: We think it’s 197 cases.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: When you say that 5000 were retrospectively recharacterized, there were only 200 in the pilot scheme, do you mean that the FCA said something – did the FCA say something to everybody else and then they went back on that?
MR CARLIER: The FCA’s own statistics on the scheme confirm that for the number that were originally in – I think it was either 21,000 or 23,000 – then they actually state a number (I think it is 5309) were then later excluded because of the new criteria. Julia’s company got the letter in I think June 2013 to say that they were now excluded. The other issue here is that obviously as in the legal profession you will be aware of time-barring issues.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: Yes.
MR CARLIER: That created a huge issue for her because she had been sold this thing in 2007 so all this time she thought she was in the review, by the time she found out she had now been excluded effectively – this was sold in April 2007 and she didn’t find out until June 2013, six years have gone, she is now time‑barred from bringing a civil case. I think the key here is the reasons why it was introduced and the FCA and the Treasury have gone on the record to say there were just two reasons. That was they brought this in to make sure that customers who were a subsidiary of a sophisticated customer were not eligible and shouldn’t have been, which is right, and joint ventures that were made up of sophisticated customers should not have been eligible, and that is why they brought it in.
It made no sense to me because presumably if you had done the pilot study and these were your findings it means you found this on a case by case basis so in other words you were able to determine, by way of the review, whether or not the customer falls into this category just by the very review process. But there is more to it than that and this is why I raised the question with Abhishek – it makes no sense because when the customer opens the account in the first place they have to do KYC and that KYC would determine associated companies and everything else.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: What does KYC mean?
MR CARLIER: Know your customer. That would establish whether or not the customer was sophisticated, part of – you have to know that. The most important thing is that all of these products, every customer was in there because they were sold a toxic product. This is incredibly important because that involves a credit review process because they have to get credit authorisation to sell the customer this product. The customer status is all important here so at that point when they were doing the credit review absolutely it would become relevant whether or not this was part of a subsidiary of a sophisticated customer or a joint venture because they would need to understand if this goes wrong can the customer pay it. The customer’s association – and I have given you the credit notes — [significant evidence from an LBG credit meeting where LBG credit assess the case submitted by the RM to sell Angelic the £20mio collar, and refer to associated businesses of Angelic and their credit worthiness also. Standard credit process for ALL high risk IRHP’s]
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: The Bristol credit meeting, that note there. [Mr Swift’s team present a copy of this evidence that I had submitted prior to the meeting and that they had printed off]
MR CARLIER: Yes, you see in there it mentions her two businesses because they have to, they are looking at associated businesses, so it would have been established prior to the sale of the product in the first place whether or not the customer fell into that category. That begged the question to Abhishek [it] made no sense. Why bring in a sledgehammer solution when the very review process – if the banks didn’t already know what companies fell into those categories the very review process would reveal that.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: Then you wrote to Abhishek and he responded saying it was put in on behalf of HMT – that is the email you sent us.
I sent it to[It was] Javid who was working at HMT at the time. Abhishek, who I presume you have met – was very involved in the set up of the scheme in the first place and you can see from his email he is very forthright and when I met with him – we were both working on Julia’s case, you have seen the report that he produced.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: Yes.
MR CARLIER: [Abhishek said] They turned up like a bunch of mafioso. He [Javid] had ‘henchmen’ with him – that is how Abhishek refers to them – around the table forcing this criterion through and it had nothing to do with the FCA. That makes sense because the skilled person that worked on these cases at Lloyds [and who gave me significant documents and testimony] – they were working on it from the outset, June/July 2012. By December their fail rate was 98%, not just his team but the teams – they were spread all over the building. All the teams, their average fail rate was 98%. They said that the people who ran the scheme were – I won’t use the exact term he said but they were scared witless because now they were starting to have – they thought 20-30% was the mis-sale rate. Now they start doing the numbers and think “Jesus Christ, the liability on this is going to be obscene” and lo and behold the measure [new sophistication criteria] gets brought in within two months and all of a sudden it excludes the 5000 biggest customers from the scheme.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER C: You say you have a dossier; do you have any sort of proof that Sajid had said anything at that juncture?
MR CARLIER: Basically I gave all my research to [REDACTED OTHER PARTY] including the Abhishek email and everything else. [REDACTED] – he can’t publish that [certain key evidence that I gave him]. He outed Sajid Javid as having brought this in —
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: We may know that he might have been in meetings but that doesn’t necessarily mean that he forced something through.
MR CARLIER: He [REDACTED] has basically corroborated and says that it was forced through by – let us not forget the letters I got from the Treasury said that they played no role, they were adamant that they played no role in this. Actually [REDACTED] —-
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: I think the letters you got from the Treasury [on behalf of John Glen MP] say that the changes made by the FSA were in response to their findings from the pilot and not the result of any intervention by the Treasury or any other party.
MR CARLIER: I then asked him [John Glen MP] to clarify, “so you are confirming that HM Treasury and no person working at or on behalf of HM Treasury had any involvement in the introduction of that criterion”, and that was directed to John Glen [an email that I had also presented to Swift prior to the meeting]. Again they wrote back on his behalf denying that there was any involvement which is contrary to Abhishek’s version of events. [REDACTED OTHER PARTY], when I gave it to him, within an hour he called me to confirm he had four
internet[independent] sources corroborating everything that I had said. [REDACTED OTHER PARTY] also had two sources that [REDACTED OTHER PARTY] was prevented from publishing confirming it came from Osborne and it wasn’t just a Treasury thing [it came from the top]. We had done calculations and they were fairly rudimentary; we would call them ‘back of a fag packet’ calculations, but we believe that the measure probably saved the banks about £15 billion in liabilities.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: I do want to pick up on that but before we go there one more question on this. I appreciate you spoke to James Hurley and he said he had other sources.
MR CARLIER: Yes.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: Your primary source is Abhishek, is that right?
MR CARLIER: That’s right, yes.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: Is there anything else we need to be aware of or is it primarily what you got from – is there anything else?
MR CARLIER: No, Abhishek is well-documented as being a witness, he was there. He is unequivocal in his email and it made sense because the reason I was asking Abhishek the question in the first place was because the introduction of such a measure made no sense for all the reasons I have described. If your finding is in the pilot study on a case by case basis you would naturally find such customers on a case by case basis in the review, and that is if they didn’t know already. As you have seen from the Credit Committee minutes – which I sent you, these as well not just to explain Julia’s case but to show the extent they went to when they were selling one of these products – they were looking at all associated businesses so they would have understood and discovered customers that fell into these categories that banks already knew, and if they didn’t they would have found out on a case by case basis in the review. Therefore this blanket £10 million makes no sense but Abhishek’s version of events does make every sense.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER A: Let me just pick up there, you said you think it saved the banks approximately £15 billion in compensation. How did you get to that figure?
MR CARLIER: It is very much a back of the fag packet figure. We know there were 13,000 that were paid out and let’s say the average – if we are talking zero to £10 million which is what the value of their swaps would have been, and if we take a broad average of £5 million we know that those customers were paid out a total of £2.3 billion in compensation. When you look at Julia’s swaps she had £15 million in caps but I think we exclude those because they are not relevant, they are appropriate products, but she has a £20 million collar and then a £40 million stepped swap, so the notional value of her products comes to £60 million – we are talking twelve times the likely average of those customers that were paid out. I have done some work on the Target Follow case, that one is mind‑blowing in numbers and whether they qualified as sophisticated is questionable. But we do know it has to be a multiple of the £2.3 billion and the bigger the swaps – if that customer then suffers consequential damage as she has done, obviously the pay-out is going to be bigger as well. Her consequential damages now, her total loss including consequential damages, stands at [approx] £400 million and we can trace it back to the 2007 sale of that collar.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER B: Did Julia not have advisers, an accountant or somebody who came along and sat with her – that is a lot of money, it is a big deal.
MR CARLIER: She has paid out [millions of pounds in fees to lawyers and advisers] – [and] Lloyds have funded Deloitte to the tune of £15 million in legal fees to go after her with litigation after litigation, but when it came to the swap – I have now worked on seven or eight different HBOS and Lloyds swap cases and there is a name that keeps coming up.
SWIFT TEAM MEMBER C: What name is that?
(I will stop the contents of that transcript there. However, rest assured that part of the transcript that follows, and is specific to a certain firm of ‘advisers’, will be the subject of another protected disclosure.)It is quite clear that I provided testimony and evidence proving Javid and HMT were the parties that forced this new sophistication criteria into the IRHP Review scheme in January 2013 NOT The FCA, and not as a result of the Pilot Study findings. Indeed, I presented evidence prior to the meeting and during this extract explaining in great detail why the £10mio criteria made no sense and did not serve the purpose for which it was claimed to have been introduced, and was entirely unneccessary for the purpose it was claimed to have been introduced due to the fact that the banks already knew all customer that fell into the two categories and would furthermore have discovered them on the same case by case basis during the review. Indeed, their claims as to the Pilot Study rather support the easy discovery of such customers on a case by case basis.
Where the reasons given are inconceivable and impossible, they can only be entirely dishonest. Whereas, the evidence and testimony of Mr Sachdev and others is the only plausible narrative and explanation.
I refer you to the below statement in an email from Mr Sachdev to myself and [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] in January 2021.
“My other reluctance to spend time on this, is that I currently see zero appetite in Westminster or in the FCA to make any changes let alone try and even CONTEMPLATE trying to increase redress by millions for thousands of SMEs. The final nail in the coffin for me was a year ago when I was interviewed by the Swift review. They expressed so much interest in hearing me for about 5-6 hours, and promised a lot of follow up etc and yet nothing.”
I am certain that Mr Sachdev had the courage to tell Mr Swift that which he told me, and provided other evidence and testimony to further prove this allegation against Mr Javid and HMT and that which I testified to during my interview with Mr Swift’s team.
I am also certain that Mr Sachdev had the courage to corroborate my testimony, my allegations and the statements that he had made to me, after Mr Swift’s team contacted him to discuss my testimony and that November 2017 email exchange.
WHEREAS, none of Mr Sachdev’s or my evidence or testimony in this respect is referenced within the report. Evidence and testimony from two former Lloyds Banking Group employees that worked on the very trading floor where this toxic garbage was sold and, in Mr Sachdev’s case, was, very much “IN THE ROOM” and witness to these events [specific to the introduction of the new sophistication criteria].
Indeed, and of note, Mr Wheatley chose not to testify or co-operate. Of course he did because he was the sole person that had testified ‘under oath’ so to speak to Parliament that there had been no pressure from HMT.
As is the case so often, the banks, FCA and others are able to, or seek to, ringfence, suppress and conceal by using the ’self-implication’ of those who know as a preventitive measure and barrier to transparency and disclosure.
Me allegations are therefore this:
1. Lloyds Banking Group know the findings within Mr Swift’s report to be false and/or misleading and/or based upon cherry picked evidence and testimony, at best, and have failed to raise their own concerns as to the nature of these findings.
2. Lloyds Banking Group have sought by way of further lobby or pressure, in addition to that which they and other banks exerted on HMT in 2013 and since, to ensure that Mr Swift’s report only included evidence and testimony that supported the desired narrative of LBG, the other banks, the FCA and HMT and Mr Javid personally.
3. Mr Swift and/or other parties that had ‘control’ or input in respect to what was to be published in this report, sought to further ensure that the report and findings served only to represent the desired narrative of LBG, the other banks, the FCA and HMT and Mr Javid personally by way of ignoring, omitting, concealing and suppressing all evidence presented by myself and Mr Sachdev [and/or others] to Mr Swift’s investigation that proved that it was Mr Javid on behalf of HMT, who were acting under pressure from LBG and other banks, who forced the new sophistication criteria into the IRHP review in January 2013, and not for the reasons presented by The FCA, HMT in 2013 and since.
4. That the FCA know the report and its findings to be entirely false and/or misleading in respect to this January 2013 sophistication criteria issue, have contributed to the false and/or misleading report and findings, and sought to publicly accept as ‘Gospel’ or fact, numerous findings they know to be false and/or misleading and/or contrived.This is contrary to the FCA mandate, gross misconduct in a public office and conduct that is way above the bar of ‘bad faith’ required to render any FCA immunity as void.
I must also refer you all as per the Tribunal case law to the Fraud Act 2006 (and other applicable law) and the numerous breaches of it represented by the above protected disclosure.
I look forward to your responses. I refer you all again to the declaration within the attached document and remind you that I make these protected disclosures in accordance with that declaration and in the public interest and with a belief that is certain.
I do not expect a full response until January, but I must request that all parties, no later than 5.00pm Thursday December 23rd, communicate any challenge they have to any of the above as to accuracy and/or provide a comment for inclusion within the next protected disclosure that I will publish and that contains the above and evidence specific to the above.
I trust that we are very clear.
It is quite clear from Mr Sachdev’s email to me, referenced within my protected disclosure above, that he, like me, was promised a further meeting and with Mr Swift personally, after the initial meeting with Mr Swift’s team.
It is quite clear according to Mr Sachdev that he, like me, never got that subsequent meeting with Mr Swift personally.
The best way to ignore testimony and evidence is not to hear it. Don’t look or ask, so that they don’t see or hear, and can better engineer the desired narrative, but without appearing dishonest.
However, despite the lack of a second meeting, the numerous emails with evidence and summaries of what they represented, sent to Mr Swift and his team, and my recorded testimony is already too substantial and significant to be ignored and omitted from the report.
Let’s be very clear here. The alleged mandate for this ‘position’ was for an ‘independent’ and comprehensive investigation to be undertaken so as to, once and for all, establish all of the issues relevant to the FCA’s IRHP Review, and establish what lessons can be learned from it.
It is further clear that by way of the omission of significant and substantial evidence and testimony from highly credible sources and witnesses, that Mr Swift’s report unequivocally fails to achieve that.
It is therefore further clear that this was ‘by design’, and that this report was produced on behalf of the same banks that exerted so much pressure so as to limit their liabilities, and on behalf of HM Treasury and The FCA that succumbed to that pressure and participated in a conspiracy to defraud over 5,000 UK businesses, and the subsequent failings, dishonesty and therefore fraud demonstrated by the banks, HM Treasury (and persons working on behalf of HM Treasury, particularly John Glen MP and before him Sajid Javid) and The FCA committed since 2013 so as to conceal and suppress the evidence of that earlier dishonesty and fraud.
The Fraud Act 2006 is quite clear as to what constitutes fraud; False representation, failing to disclose information etc etc. It is quite clear that the sale of IRHP’s, the FCA’s IRHP Review and the Swift report are an almost decade long narrative littered with false representation and a failure to disclose information. However, is the Swift report, and the conduct of The FCA and HM Treasury not also “Fraud by abuse of position”?
I refer you to a quote taken directly from a document published by a firm very much favoured by the banks in question, Grant Thornton.
“Section 4: Fraud by Abuse of Position
Section 4 makes it an offence to commit a fraud by dishonestly abusing one’s position. It applies in situations where the defendant has been put in a privileged position, and by virtue of this position is expected to safeguard another’s financial interests or not act against those interests.
The term “abuse” is not limited by a definition, because it is intended to cover a wide range of conduct. The offence can be committed by omission as well as by positive action.“